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Abstract
In media markets, the value of advertisement exposure depends on circulation, and media consumers’ valuation is
affected by advertising. This paper analyzes media market competition in a duopoly framework. There exist symmetric
and asymmetric equilibria in terms of firm size. There is less scope for asymmetry when products are more differentiated
or of higher intrinsic quality. Some media exhibit public good features. This increases the scope for asymmetry when
consumers value advertising positively. If their valuation is negative only symmetric equilibria exist. Regulations
limiting price competition increase the scope for natural monopoly. Finally, monopoly is a less likely outcome in
subscription-based media markets.   
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Quoted in Lears (1994, p. 201).
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Media market concentration is discussed in e.g. Chaudhri (1998) and Rosse & Dertouzos (1979). The
2
interdependency between sub-markets has been examined in e.g. Rosse (1970), Masson, Mudambi & Reynolds (1990)
Blair & Romano (1993) and Chaudhri (1998). 
For example, owners of media monopolies could have private incentives to misrepresent news and to
3
introduce a political bias in reporting. Therefore, a diversified free press is often considered to be a merit good; see e.g.
Strömberg (1998).
"A magazine is simply a device to induce people to read advertising." 
        - James Collins (1907), ad executive.
1
1. Introduction
Media markets tend to share two common features. First, they are often highly concentrated.
Second, media firms, such as newspapers, magazines and commercial television channels, operate
simultaneously in two sub-markets. Not only do they sell their products to readers, viewers or
listeners, they also sell advertising space to firms. Moreover, these markets are generally
interrelated on the demand side. For example, the value of placing an ad in a local newspaper
depends on the paper’s circulation, and the subscribers’ valuation of the newspaper is, at least to
some extent, affected by the type and amount of advertising.
2
It is sometimes argued that demand linkages of this type give rise to positive spirals that
partly explain the strong tendency towards concentration in media markets. For instance, a
newspaper with a growing circulation may enjoy a strong demand for advertisements. This allows
it to charge more for its ads and still attract a large advertising volume which, in turn, makes it
more appealing to subscribers. Needless to say, the fact that the production of media content often
involves high fixed costs further increases the benefits conferred by size. 
From a policy point of view, the economic efficiency aspects of media concentration, e.g.
the price-cost margins on newspaper copies, are likely to be outweighed by concerns that
increased media concentration may have adverse effects on the democratic process.  This issue
32
The welfare effects of advertising are complicated by the possibility that advertising affects tastes. This issue
4
is discussed by Dixit & Norman (1978) who argue that there is excessive advertising in equilibrium, even when the
point of reference is post advertising tastes. See also Fischer & McGowan (1979) and Shapiro (1980) for a critique.
For example, Dertouzos & Trautman (1990) claim that fewer than one percent of the newspapers in the US
5
face direct competition from other newspapers published in the same city.
is reflected in special provisions in, or amendments to, competition laws, government subsidies
and other policies designed to counter concentration tendencies or mitigate the effects of
increasing concentration. For instance, the British Fair Trading Act contains special rules
concerning newspaper mergers. In the US, the Newspaper Preservation Act allows joint operating
agreements between papers in order to preserve independent editorial offices in markets where
otherwise only one paper would remain. In Norway and Sweden, small newspapers receive
subsidies with the objective of allowing for political diversity in media markets. Several countries
also have various restrictions on ownership of media firms, including limits to foreign ownership
and rules concerning cross-ownership.
Despite the policy interest in media concentration there have been relatively few attempts
to study the economic mechanisms that may explain media market concentration. In this paper,
we analyze the interplay among circulation, advertising and market structure by means of a dual
market Bertrand model. The focus is positive rather than normative.  Since diversity is at the core
4
of the policy discussion we allow for product differentiation in our model. However, the added
complexity of product differentiation confines our analysis to a duopoly framework. Market
structure, which is endogenous in the model, is therefore either monopolistic or duopolistic. In
terms of the newspaper industry, this may not be such a restrictive assumption as a large fraction
of local newspaper markets are highly concentrated in many countries.
5
Our objective is to examine the market based mechanisms behind tendencies toward
concentration in media markets. In so doing, we abstract from other potentially important3
determinants of market concentration, like the industry cost structure. Our discussion is cast
mostly in terms of newspaper markets, although the results also have bearing on other markets
with a similar structure, such as markets for commercial television and radio broadcasting. In the
latter case, the media product often has public good characteristics. This raises the question as
to whether or not the public good property affects the tendency towards increased media market
concentration.  
Since both consumers of media and buyers of advertisements base their decisions on the
behavior of the other group, expectations play an important role in the analysis. When someone
buys a copy of the New York Times, he expects to find a certain mix of ads and articles. Similarly,
an advertiser bases his decision on beliefs about the New York Times’ readership. There are no
guarantees, however, that these beliefs are fulfilled ex post. One interpretation of the
monopolization argument is that expectations become self-fulfilling prophecies that constrain
small newspapers while large ones benefit, and that it is difficult for firms to change these
expectations.
The economics literature on media markets is mainly empirical and has examined issues
such as the relation between market concentration and advertising rates. For example, Landon
(1971) finds that concentration and advertising rates are positively correlated, while a more recent
study by Reimer (1992) reaches the opposite conclusion. Another branch of the literature deals
with the relationship between ownership structure and advertising rates. It is argued that
crosswise ownership will tend to dampen price competition and increase advertising rates. The
empirical support for this hypothesis is weak, however; see Ferguson (1983) and Parkman (1984).
There is also a technology oriented strand of the empirical literature. For example, Dertouzos &
Trautman (1990) find evidence of significant scale economies in the newspaper industry. 
To our knowledge, theoretical contributions in the field are quite rare. An exception is an4
It may to some extent be argued that the nature of the advertising externality is related to whether the media
6
product is a public or a private good. For instance, while television viewers can avoid commercial messages by flipping
between channels, they cannot avoid the interruption. Consumers of printed media, on the other hand, choose whether
to read an ad or not. With practically free disposal, consumers are much more likely to put a positive value on
advertising.
interesting study by Masson, Mudambi & Reynolds (1990) that examines the relationship between
concentration and advertising rates in a symmetric framework where advertising affects consumer
utility negatively and the media product is a public good. The model is tailored to fit markets for
commercial broadcasting. It is found that advertising rates are higher, the stronger the negative
externality on viewer utility. Furthermore, monopoly advertising rates may be lower than
oligopoly rates. A media market oligopolist that lowers advertising rates (thereby increasing the
volume of commercials) risks losing viewers to competitors. This, in turn, reduces advertisers’
willingness to pay for commercials. A monopolist does not face this restriction and may therefore
choose a lower advertising rate. Chaudhri (1998) discusses pricing in industries where consumers
have a positive valuation of advertising, so-called circulation industries. His study examines the
polar cases of perfect competition and monopoly. It is shown that positive consumption
externalities may push the monopoly consumer price, e.g. the price of a single copy of a
newspaper, below marginal cost. Similar results were reached by Blair and Romano (1993) in a
study that focused entirely on the monopoly case.
Our analysis is complementary to that of Masson, Mudambi & Reynolds (1990) in that we
are mainly concerned with positive advertising externalities in a framework where the media
product is a private good. We only briefly discuss the public good case.  Whereas Chaudhri
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(1998) examines welfare effects under given market structures, we treat market structure as an
endogenous variable that is determined by the strategic interaction between firms.  
In our model, positive demand externalities between the markets may result in asymmetric
equilibria and in some cases natural monopolies, i.e., equilibria where monopolistic behavior on5
the part of one firm makes it rational for the other firm not to produce. Specifically, consumers’
valuation of advertisements interacts with the degree of product differentiation to determine the
existence of asymmetric equilibria. The scope for natural monopoly equilibria is reduced when
products are more differentiated and the intrinsic quality of the products is higher. The results
concerning media markets where the product has public good characteristics, such as markets for
TV and radio broadcasting, are mixed. If the advertising externality is positive, the public good
property will tend to increase the scope for natural monopoly equilibria. If the externality is
negative, only symmetric equilibria are feasible. Regulations that curtail price competition in the
media market will have the same effect as a reduction in the intrinsic quality level, i.e., they will
increase the scope for natural monopoly equilibria.
The results concerning market structure are determined implicitly. In order to examine
firm profits and discuss incentives for product differentiation, however, we need explicit solutions
and thus resort to an analytically tractable example of the case where consumers value advertising
positively. We find that firm profits may be decreasing in the degree of market power.
Competition is intensified as products become closer substitutes. This, in turn, makes higher
production and advertising volumes credible. When consumers’ valuation of advertisements is
positive, this results in an increase in consumer willingness to pay, which can be exploited by
firms. For the same reason, monopoly profits are sometimes lower than duopoly profits. 
In subscription based media markets, it is relatively easy for advertisers to predict
circulation levels. Hence, it could be argued that timing is essentially sequential. First, consumers
decide whether or not to subscribe. This decision is based on expected levels of advertising.
Second, advertisers base their decisions on observed subscription stocks. We find that the
tendency towards monopoly is weaker in subscription based markets.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the basic model and characterize theBi  ’  BMi  %  BAi  ’  pMiqMi  %  pAiqAi












This representation is an extension of the model developed by Dixit (1979). Our specification is identical to
7
the original one for b = 0.
feasible media market equilibria in section 2. Next, in section 3, we compare how the equilibria
depend on whether the consumer product is a private or a public good.  In section 4 we examine
firm profitability and the incentives for product differentiation in the context of an example. The
model is then extended to allow for subscription based media in section 5. Some concluding
remarks are offered in section 6. 
2.  A Media Market Duopoly
There are two firms competing à la Bertrand, both in the consumer market (M) and in the market
for advertisements (A). For simplicity, suppose that firms face zero production costs. The total
profit of firm i is then simply the sum of its revenues in the consumer market and in the advertising
market,
where (p , p ) are the prices charged in the consumer and the advertising market, respectively, Mi Ai
and (q , q ) denote the corresponding demand. Mi Ai
Consumer preferences (of readers, viewers or listeners) are represented by a simple utility
function such that utility is quadratic in media consumption and linear in the consumption of other
goods, I. The representative consumer is assumed to have a positive demand for both media
goods. The utility function can be interpreted as an aggregate representation of preferences, i.e.,
individual consumers may limit their consumption to one of the products:  
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As regards the impact of negative externalities (b < 0), discussed in section 3, it is natural to believe that utility
8
decreases in advertising at an increasing rate so that r > 1. 
The second-order conditions hold for all interior solutions.
9
Consumers might, for example, have a weak preference for advertised products. An alternative interpretation
10
would be that consumers are uninformed about the existence of some products and that advertising is informative.
(1)
Boldface characters indicate vectors of corresponding values for each firm, e.g. q  = {q , q } M Mi Mj
and q  = {q , q }. The parameter c0[0, 1] measures the substitutability between the media A Ai Aj
content provided by the two firms  (i.e., the degree of product differentiation). If c = 0, each firm
has monopolistic market power, while if c = 1, the products are perfect substitutes. Media
consumers are assumed to have a positive but decreasing marginal valuation of the advertising
volume. This is reflected by the parameter r0[0, 1]. Finally, a measures the intrinsic quality of the
media product and b reflects the impact of advertisements on utility.
8
Consumers maximize utility conditional on the expected advertising volumes q , where
- -
A
a tilde denotes expectation, subject to the budget constraint p q  + p q  + I # m, where m is Mi Mi Mj Mj
the consumer’s income.  The consumption of other goods, I, is assumed to consist of two
9
components, advertised goods, S, and non-advertised goods, Z. All else equal, an increase in the
advertising intensity will shift demand from non-advertised to advertised products.  The price of
10
the composite good is normalized to one. The demand for product i is then given by:
Firms set consumer prices to maximize profits, taking the other firm’s price as given. Firm i’s
reaction function is then:           which ensures
existence of a price equilibrium given byp
(
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The corresponding equilibrium demand is given by
Let us now turn to the advertising market. On the demand side, there is a representative
profit-maximizing advertiser who acts as a price taker in all markets. The purpose of advertising
is to generate sales. For simplicity, it is assumed that the consumption of advertised goods, S,  can
be represented as an additively separable function, S(q , q ) = q q  + q q  where q  is the A M A Ai Mi Aj Mj
" $ " $
number of ads per year and q  daily circulation. Then q q  can be interpreted as the total M Ai Mi
consumer exposure generated by advertising in media i. The sales technology is likely to exhibit
decreasing returns, both in terms of advertising and circulation, i.e., ", $0[0, 1]. Consumers are
either exposed or unexposed to advertising. An increase in the number of ads (for a given
circulation) would lead to fewer unexposed consumers and increase the exposure intensity among
those exposed. The marginal return on increased exposure intensity is likely to be decreasing.
Similarly, an increase in circulation (keeping advertising fixed) has two types of effects.  First,
there may be an influx of new potential customers, i.e., individuals previously unexposed to
advertising because they had not consumed the media good. Second, the existing stock of media
consumers may start purchasing the media good more frequently, which means that they would
be exposed to ads more often. The latter effect in particular is likely to yield a diminishing
marginal return on increased circulation.qAi(pAi,  ˜ qMi)  ’  n(pAi) ˜ q
$
1&"
Mi   ,
q
(
Ai(˜ qMi)  ’  ˜ q
D
Mi
S(qA,qM)  &  pAiqAi  &  pAjqAj ,
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For an individual who advertises a single item in the classifieds section, the return to increasing circulation
11
is likely to be rapidly decreasing. By contrast, for a department store, the profitability of attracting an additional customer
is likely to decrease at a much slower rate.
Remember that the price of other goods is normalized to one. Assuming zero cost of
production, the advertiser then maximizes profits,            with respect
to q  conditional on the expected circulation in the media market, q . The first-order conditions A M
- -
are independent, which means that there are no cross-price effects in the demand for advertising.
Specifically, firm i faces the following demand for ads
where n(p ) = ("/p ) . We assume a common and constant marginal cost of producing Ai Ai
1/(1-")
advertisements, MC . The multiplicative demand structure then implies that the profit-maximizing A
advertising rates are independent of the expected level of circulation, q . Moreover, the
- -
Mi
equilibrium advertising rates will be equal across firms, p  = p  = p . Hence, the equilibrium
* * *
Ai Aj A
levels of advertising are proportional to the expected circulations in the media market. The
equilibrium value of n is thus determined entirely by the demand conditions in the advertising
market and can be treated as a constant. For convenience, we normalize it to one so that the
equilibrium demand for advertising equals: 
where D / $/(1-"). The parameter D0[0, 1] can be interpreted as the average elasticity of demand
with respect to circulation and will depend on advertiser characteristics.  For simplicity, we
11q
(
Ai(˜ qMi)  ’  ˜ qMi.
10
The parameters " and $ can be interpreted as the elasticities of sales with respect to advertising and
12
circulation, respectively. Assuming D = 1 implies  $ = 1 - " which, in turn, means that the sales technology is
characterized by constant returns to scale, i.e. a simultaneous increase in advertising intensity and circulation will lead
to a proportionate increase in sales.
In Dertouzos & Trautman (1990) the estimated value of D for the US is 0.82.With D ￿ 1 the existence of
13
equilibria depends on rD instead of r. Therefore, all of our results except Corollary 2 (where the sequential structure
complicates matters) can easily be established for D < 1. 
(4)
normalize D to one.  Such a normalization is approximately consistent with empirical findings and
12
the loss in terms of generality is modest.   The equilibrium advertising demand facing firm i then
13
simply equals its expected circulation
An increase in circulation is assumed to have a positive impact on the advertisers’ willingness to
pay. If such a demand shift occurs, the firm in question would generally experience an increase
in the equilibrium demand for advertisements as well as an increase in the advertising rate. Our
specification has the convenient property that all adjustments take place in terms of quantity.
Firms that enjoy a stronger demand for their media product simply sell more advertisements.
Another important feature is that the demand for advertising facing firm i is unaffected by changes
in firm j’s circulation. In other words, there is no strategic interaction in terms of circulation.
In a rational expectations equilibrium, beliefs must be consistent with realized equilibrium
quantities. This consistency requirement can be expressed in terms of either circulation or
advertising volumes. We follow the latter path and let expected circulation (q  in expression (4))
- -
M
equal realized circulation (q  in expression (3)). This yields two equations relating the
*
M
equilibrium advertising for each firm to the expected advertising of both firms. Requiring the
equilibrium volumes to equal the expected volumes gives us the following condition for the
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(5)
In equilibrium this condition must be satisfied for both firms simultaneously. For positive expected
circulation, the right-hand side of (5) is increasing in q . Moreover, it is strictly concave (for
- -
Ai
r < 1) and the marginal increase tends to zero as q  approaches infinity. Thus for a sufficiently
- -
Ai
high q  = q , expression (5) is satisfied for q    




~   = 0. For higher q  Ai
~   there is no positive q  Aj
~    that
satisfies the expectations condition. Three examples of the above condition are illustrated
graphically in Figure 1. Equilibrium beliefs correspond to intersections.
Figure 1 about here
It is evident from Figure 1 that there may be multiple equilibria, symmetric and asymmetric. For
interior equilibria, it is easy to solve condition (5) for q ˜  which is then a continuous function of Aj
q ˜ . Similarly, q ˜  can be expressed as a continuous function of q ˜ . For analytical convenience we Ai Ai Aj
use the transformed variables (q ˜ ) = x and (q ˜ )  = x. Then x is a continuous function g of x, i.e., Aj j Ai i j i
r r
x = g(x), that is concave on x 0 [0, x ] where x  = (q ) . Since the expectations conditions j i i i i Ai
max max max r - -
are symmetric, we also have that x = g(x). The equilibrium condition can now be expressed in i j
terms of the choice variable of one of the firms, e.g. x  = g(g(x)). The composite function g(g(C)) i i
may either be single peaked or have two peaks of equal height. Figure 2 illustrates a single and
a double peaked g(g(C)), respectively. Graphically, the equilibrium points are given by the
intersections between the 45E line and g(g(C)).12
Figure 2 about here
Equilibrium points where at least one firm has a strictly positive circulation always exist since the
function is continuous, starts above the 45E line and eventually decreases to zero. For the special
case a = 0, there also exists a symmetric zero quantity equilibrium. If the product has no intrinsic
value and consumers expect no ads to appear, then they will not buy the product; consequently
it does not pay to advertise and the beliefs are fulfilled. We abstract from this equilibrium in the
subsequent discussion.
Proposition 1: When the media products have a strictly positive intrinsic quality, a > 0, there
exists one symmetric equilibrium {x , x }. In addition, there may exist at most two asymmetric
* *




Equilibria with large asymmetries between firms could be interpreted as market outcomes that are
close to natural monopolies. To better understand the conditions that may drive the market
towards high concentration we characterize the set of equilibria and relate existence to the
parameters of the model.
There are three types of equilibria: symmetric equilibria, asymmetric equilibria with strictly
positive market shares for both firms and equilibria where one firm is a natural monopolist. There13
always exists a symmetric equilibrium. The existence of asymmetric equilibria depends on the level
of product quality, a, consumers’ valuation of advertisements, b, the degree of product
differentiation, c, and the extent to which the advertising externality is characterized by decreasing
returns, r.
In Proposition 2 we relate the existence of asymmetric (and symmetric) equilibria to the
degree of product differentiation. The most important result is that there exists a unique threshold
for the degree of product differentiation, c , above which natural monopolies and asymmetric
*
equilibria are feasible. Below c  only symmetric equilibria exist.  In a sense, the lower this
*
threshold, the greater the scope for the emergence of a monopolistic market structure.
Proposition 2: For a, b, r > 0 there exist two threshold levels of product differentiation c  and c
* **
(where 0 # c  # c # 1) such that (i) a symmetric equilibrium exists for c0[0, 1], (ii) an
* **
asymmetric equilibrium exists for c0[c , c ], while (iii) a natural monopoly equilibrium exists for
* **
c0[c , 1]. (iv) For b < 0, only symmetric equilibria exist. (v) Claims (i)-(iv) hold regardless of
*
whether the media good is private or public.
Proof: See Appendix.
Although closed-form solutions for the equilibrium quantities cannot be derived, the equilibria can
be characterized in qualitative terms. Moreover, we can plot the threshold functions c (r) and
*
c (r) for different values of product quality, a, and consumer valuation of advertising, b; see
**
Figure 3.14
Figure 3 about here
First, consider the case where media products have no intrinsic quality (a = 0) so that demand
would be zero in the absence of advertising. Then, a natural monopoly can always be sustained
in equilibrium. If consumers expect the advertising volume to be zero, they will not buy the
product. Hence, zero volume expectations are always fulfilled in equilibrium. In other words,  the
low threshold, c , is equal to zero. If the media products have a strictly positive intrinsic quality
*
(a > 0) and products are so differentiated that they are effectively on separate markets (i.e., if
c = 0) then obviously a natural monopoly cannot be sustained. Positive product quality in
combination with perfect monopoly power guarantees positive circulation and this, in turn,
guarantees a positive advertising volume. Hence, for a > 0 it must be the case that c (r) > 0. It is
*
straightforward to verify that the low threshold c  increases monotonically in the intrinsic quality
*
level, a. 
Corollary 1: The low threshold c  increases in a, i.e., the scope for natural monopoly equilibria
*
is smaller in high-quality markets.
Thus, for media markets characterized by relatively high quality, say with extensive and in-depth
editorial material, there is at least one force that may make them less concentrated. Intuitively,
higher quality makes symmetric equilibria more likely since the relative importance of the positive
externality between the market diminishes - consumers do not buy the newspaper only for its
advertisements. On the other hand, high quality content is often associated with high fixed costs,15
which we have abstracted from in our analysis. This can be expected to increase the concentration
tendencies in media markets. 
3.  The Role of Price Competition
So far it has been assumed that firms compete in prices in the media market. Sometimes, market
characteristics may place constraints on pricing and firms may try to strategically limit price
competition. For example, in some media markets firms offer products that are public goods,
while in other markets firms may be constrained by regulations or collusive agreements. An
interesting question then is whether or not the scope for natural monopoly equilibria is stronger
under these circumstances.
3.1 Media Markets with Public Goods
Radio stations and most TV channels do not charge consumers for their broadcasts. Broadcasting
technology has strong public good features, even though cable networks and satellite broadcasting
technologies have led to an increasing share of pay-per-view services. 
In markets with public good characteristics, p  = p  = 0 by assumption. In Figure 4 we Mi Mj
illustrate how the threshold values of product differentiation in the private good case compare
with those in the public good case. The left panel of Figure 4 is identical to Figure 3 while the
right panel illustrates the case where the media product is a public good. In the figure, the
threshold values c  and c  are larger in the former case. This relation can be shown to hold
* **
generally.
Proposition 3: All else equal, the critical values c  and c  are higher when the media product is
* **
a private good than when it is a public good.16
Proof: See Appendix.
Figure 4 about here
In the presence of positive demand externalities, products offered by small firms are less attractive
in the eyes of the consumer as compared to products offered by large firms. Hence, when the
media good is private, large firms are able to charge higher prices in equilibrium. In the public
good case, small firms and large firms are bounded to charge the same price, namely p  = p  = Mi Mj
0.  Hence, there is no price differential to dampen the asymmetry between firms in terms of size.
Consequently, monopoly equilibria are feasible for a wider range of c’s. Of course, competition
between TV channels and newspapers differs in many other respects, so that the empirical
implication of Proposition 3 is not clear-cut. The public good feature of broadcasting does,
however, unambiguously tend to strengthen the scope for monopolization.
Advertising in broadcasting media is often thought to have a negative impact on consumer
utility. For example, this is the underlying assumption in Masson, Mudambi & Reynolds (1990).
In our framework this would correspond to a negative b. In Proposition 2 it was shown that
asymmetric equilibria cease to exist once b turns negative.
We may conclude that the results concerning markets where the media good is a public
good are mixed and depend on whether consumers perceive advertising as a good or a bad. If
advertising affects utility positively, the public good property will tend to increase the scope for
monopolistic equilibria. If, on the other hand, consumers place a negative value on advertising
then natural monopoly is not an equilibrium outcome. As mentioned earlier, the latter case may
be more likely to occur in media markets with public good characteristics, where advertising often
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3.2 Price Regulations and Collusive Agreements
An alternative interpretation of Proposition 3 is that a regulation or collusive agreement which
discourages price competition may strengthen the tendency towards monopoly. It is in fact the
case that any constraint which prevents competition in the media market will increase the scope
for monopolization.
Proposition 4: A regulation or collusive agreement that ties the media market prices to some
common level p  (where p  > 0) reduces the critical values c  and c  as compared to the public M M
* **
good case.
Proof: The media market demand (for arbitrary advertising expectations) is given by expression
(1). By letting p  = p  = p  we may rewrite this expression in the following form: Mi Mj M
The public good case is equivalent to p  = 0, while p  > 0 is formally equivalent to a reduction M M
in a. From the proof of Proposition 2 it is clear that c  and c  are increasing in a. ~
* **
In the light of Proposition 4, some government policies aimed at promoting diversity in
newspaper markets may have detrimental effects. A good example is the Swedish policy that
allows the second largest firm in local newspaper markets to apply for government subsidies. An
important prerequisite, however, is that the subscription fee of the applicant firm may not be18
The Swedish Code of Statutes (SFS) 1990:524.
14
lower than the average fee within the same category of newspapers.  As a consequence, price
14
competition is effectively curtailed. Another example is the Newspaper Preservation Act which
has been argued to reduce competitive pressure among newspapers in the US (Barnett (1993)).
4.  An Example
While the model allows us to examine how the demand linkages between media and advertising
markets affect market structure, it is difficult to consider profitability without explicit analytical
solutions for the equilibrium quantities. This also means that we cannot, in general, study issues
such as firms’ incentives for product differentiation. For these reasons we now examine an
analytically tractable example where the media good is private, namely the case where r = 1/2,
a = 0, and b = 1. To determine the profit in the advertising market, we also need to assume a
value for p . Since it is determined by the demand conditions in that market and is independent A
of everything else, it has thus far been treated as an arbitrary constant. For simplicity we let p = 1. A 
The example is then used as a point of departure for discussing product differentiation. 
Figure 5 shows equilibrium prices and quantities in the media market as a function of the
degree of product differentiation, c, for symmetric as well as asymmetric equilibria. The left panel
shows the equilibrium consumer prices, p , and the right panel shows the corresponding demand, M
q . M
Figure 5 about here19
Figure 6 illustrates how the firms’ profits depend on the degree of product differentiation. The
first panel shows the advertising market profit, B , the second panel the consumer market profit, A
B , and the third panel the total profit, B = B  + B .  M A M
Figure 6 about here
Note that the profit in the advertising market must be proportional to the output in the media
market since the equilibrium quantities are proportional and the price in the advertising market
is a constant determined by demand conditions. Here the advertising profit coincides with the
output in the media market since q  = q  and p  = 1.  A M A
In our example, about eighty percent of the revenues comes from advertising when media
products are fully differentiated. In a symmetric equilibrium, this share increases as products
become closer substitutes and competition in the media market becomes more intense. This seems
intuitive enough, but why is the equilibrium output in the symmetric case U-shaped in c? We
would generally expect equilibrium quantities to increase as products become less differentiated.
When media products are highly differentiated, firms have a considerable degree of market power.
As c increases, and media products become closer substitutes, the representative consumer
reallocates demand from media to other consumption goods. One interpretation of this aggregate
response is that families or workplaces which previously subscribed to two newspapers (to cater
to diverse tastes) may settle for only one as the papers become more similar and spend their
money on something else instead. As seen in the left panel of Figure 5, price decreases at an
approximately constant rate in c which means that the price cuts in percentage terms increase20
In the example, a = c  = 0 which means that asymmetric equilibria are indeed consistent with an extreme
15 *
amount of product differentiation. In the general case (i.e., for a, c  > 0), however, asymmetric equilibria cease to exist
*
when differentiation is strong enough. 
sharply. For low c, firms face little competition from each other and lower prices moderately in
response to declining demand. For high c, competition is more intense and further increases in c
are met by more aggressive pricing, which in turn results in increased output.
Let us now turn to asymmetric equilibria with interior solutions. In this case, firms are
actually hurt by having too much market power. In a sense, firms are captives of expectations.
Strong product differentiation is consistent with low levels of circulation and advertising. When
consumers attach a positive value to advertising, this implies a relatively low willingness to pay
for the media product. Less product differentiation can therefore raise the profits of both firms
in the sense that larger circulations and advertising volumes become credible. Consumers’
willingness to pay is then reinforced by positive consumption externalities which, to some extent,
can be exploited by the firms. 
As products become close substitutes, interior asymmetric equilibria cease to exist. A low
degree of differentiation means that the value added of the second largest newspaper is small in
the eyes of the consumer and it becomes more difficult to fight a bigger competitor. Hence,
natural monopoly is the only feasible asymmetric equilibrium. Similarly, for products that are
strongly differentiated, so that the media products are practically on separate markets, asymmetric
equilibria, as well as natural monopoly equilibria, are inconsistent with rational expectations.
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In Figure 6 the symmetric duopoly profit (and the larger firm’s profit in the asymmetric
equilibrium) converges to the monopoly profit as products become maximally differentiated.
Clearly, both firms would prefer the asymmetric duopoly equilibrium to the natural monopoly
equilibrium if products are strongly differentiated, i.e., if c is small. In other words, when products
are highly differentiated it is valuable to have a competitor. Again, the explanation is that21
competition makes larger volumes credible, which increases profits in the presence of bilateral
externalities.
Considering that the low threshold, c , is generally greater than zero, the incentives to
*
differentiate products are complex. Firms that are stuck in the symmetric equilibrium would gain
by increasing differentiation maximally (since B(c = 0) > B(c = 1)). Firms in an asymmetric
equilibrium have conflicting interests. The large firm would prefer an intermediate degree of
differentiation, while the small firm would be better off in the symmetric equilibrium. Both a
reduction and an increase in the degree of differentiation could trigger such a switch in equilibria.
Finally, if there is initially a natural monopoly equilibrium, the only viable strategy for an entrant
firm is to produce a remote substitute in relation to the incumbent’s product. 
It should also be noted that advertising rates per reader (p  / q ) are concave in the degree A Mi
of product differentiation in the symmetric equilibrium of our example. This reflects that
circulation, q , is convex in the same argument. Hence, there exist intervals in which increases Mi
in market power will reduce advertising rates as they are measured in Reimer (1992). The
importance of this similarity between the implications of our model and Reimer’s (1992) empirical
findings should not be exaggerated, however, as his concept of market power is based on market
concentration rather than on product differentiation. 
5. Subscription Based Media Markets
In subscription based media markets, it is relatively easy for advertisers to predict consumer
demand. In some newspaper markets, notably in the UK, consumers contract with news agents
for deliveries rather than subscribe directly from newspapers. The central feature here, however,
is that advertisers are reasonably well informed about the level of circulation when they make their
decisions. This makes timing essentially sequential. First, firms set prices for the media good, e.g.Bi  ’  BMi  %  BAi  ’  (pMi  %  pA  &  MCA)qMi
q
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newspaper subscriptions, knowing that the advertising market outcome is determined entirely by
the media market circulation. Consumers also recognize this, but since an individual consumer’s
decisions only have a negligible impact on circulation, they base their subscription decisions on
the subscription price and the expected advertising volume. Second, advertisers base their
advertising decisions on observed subscription stocks. Except for the change in the timing of
decisions, the model specification remains unchanged. As before,  equilibrium advertising rates,
p , are independent of the level of circulation. Thus, here the equilibrium advertising volume is A
equal to actual circulation, rather than expected circulation (cf. expression (4)). Consequently,
firms in subscription based media markets maximize the following profit function with respect to
the subscription fee, p : Mi
where q  is given by expression (1). Equilibrium demand in the media market (for arbitrary Mi
expectations concerning q ) then equals A
which is identical to expression (3) for p  - MC  = 0. Thus we can see that the effect of taking the A A
sequential structure of subscription based media markets into account is formally equivalent to
an increase in the intrinsic quality level, a. Since the advertising volume is determined entirely by
circulation, the advertising market effectively becomes part of the media market, which is
equivalent to an upward shift in demand, i.e. the same effect as a higher a. This, in turn, implies
that we can draw on Corollary 1 and reinterpret it in the following way;23
Corollary 2: The scope for natural monopoly equilibria is smaller in subscription based media
markets than in markets where advertising and media market volumes are determined
simultaneously, i.e., the low threshold c  is higher in the former case.
*
Note that whereas there is reason to believe that a higher a is associated with higher fixed costs,
this is not the case for markets that are subscription based. Thus, Corollary 2 has a more clear-cut
interpretation than Corollary 1.
When the game is sequential, it is possible to compensate for a small expected advertising
volume by choosing a low price in the media market. This, in turn, will lead to a higher realized
advertising volume ex post. Roughly speaking, in a sequential game, small advertising volumes
are not as likely to be part of a rational expectations equilibrium.
Real-world media markets are seldom pure subscription markets or pure non-subscription
markets. We may nevertheless conclude that our results hold for the extreme cases, where
circulation is either fully observed or determined entirely by expectations. 
6. Concluding Remarks
By explicitly taking into account the demand linkages between media markets and markets for
advertisements, we found that the market outcome is likely to differ substantially from what is
predicted by standard oligopoly theory. When products are strongly differentiated, equilibrium
beliefs are symmetric. This yields a symmetric duopoly outcome. When products are closer
substitutes, asymmetric equilibria and natural monopolies are equally plausible outcomes.  Hence,
there is some theoretical justification for concerns about excessive concentration in media
markets, especially in markets where media goods are of low intrinsic quality and where
consumers are not bound by subscription contracts. From a policy point of view, we may24
conclude that regulations which reduce price competition among media firms may increase the
scope for monopoly.
An interesting extension would be to allow for different levels of intrinsic product quality.
In such a framework, it might be possible to study the incentives to invest in quality enhancing
technologies. This could potentially have a strong impact on the process that determines market
structure. From an empirical perspective, it would be interesting to examine the relation between
product quality, for instance measured in terms of the amount of editorial material, and market
structure. A further aspect would be to test whether media markets where subscription contracts
are common tend to be less concentrated.25
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Proof of Proposition 1: Strict concavity, g(0) > 0 and g(x ) = 0 implies that there exists exactly
max
one point x 0[0, x ) such that g(x ) = x  and consequently g(g(x )) = x .
* max * * * *
Suppose x is an asymmetric equilibrium point. Then g(x) = 2 x where 2 x is a point such that
g(2 x) = x. Thus 2 x is also an equilibrium point since, by assumption, g(g(2 x)) = g(x) = 2 x. Moreover,
note that g(x) > x for x < x . Thus if x < x  and g(x) < x  then x < g(x) < g(g(x)). Hence, such an
* * *
x cannot be an equilibrium. Consequently, if x < x  and g(g(x)) = x then 2 x = g(x) > x .
* *
To simplify notation let µ = (2-c )/c and 8 = (4-c )(1-c )/(bc) where 8 $ 0 and µ $ 1, since
2 2 2
c0[0,1]. Then               . If g(g(x)) can intersect the 45E line from below
only once, there exist at most three equilibria. Since g(g(0)) > 0, such intersections must lie on
the increasing segment between two peaks (the interval [argmax g(x), max{x* g(x) = argmax
g(x)}]) where g´(g(x)) = µ-(8/r)g(x)  < 0 and g´(x) = µ-(8/r)x  < 0. To prove that there is at
1/r-1 1/r-1
most one intersection from below, it suffices to show that the slope of the equilibrium condition
g(g(x)) - x = 0, which we denote F(x) = g´(g(x)) g´(x)-1, is strictly quasi-concave on the interval.
Thus, FO(x) is negative for r $ 1/2 since g´(g(x)) and g´(x) < 0. To show quasi-concavity also for
r < 1/2, we evaluate FO(x) at points where FN(x) = 0. Using FN(x) = 0 for substitution in the first
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This expression is strictly negative for r < 1/2 and consequently F is strictly quasi concave on the
interval. 
Finally, there exists at most one natural monopoly equilibrium {g(x ) = 0 ,  g(0) = x }
NM NM
since there is only one x  such that g(x ) = 0. (For existence see Proposition 2). ~
NM NM
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we characterize c  and c  and
* **
show that if b > 0 then (i) a symmetric equilibrium exists for c0[0, 1]. Second, we prove that: (ii)
an asymmetric equilibrium exists for c0[c , c ], and (iii) a natural monopoly equilibrium exists
* **
for c0[c , 1]. Third, it is shown that only a symmetric equilibrium exists if b < 0. The same
*
reasoning applies when the media good is public, but then the equilibrium is conditional on p  = Mi
p  = 0. The expressions corresponding to the public good case are indicated by a PG index. Mj
Step I: Let c (r) be the set of {c, r} for which 1) the equilibrium is symmetric and 2)
**
g(g(x)) is tangent to the 45E line. In a symmetric equilibrium, expressions (5) and (1) must hold
for x = x = x, which yields; i j
These expressions have unique interior solutions for c0[0, 1] which establishes (i). The
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Similarly, let c (r) be the set of {c, r} such that the smallest equilibrium quantity is equal to zero.
*
Thus, c (r) must satisfy 0 = g(g(0)) which, in turn, means that c (r) is implicitly defined by:
* *
The right-hand sides of (A4) and (A5) strictly decrease in c. Hence, c (r) and c (r) are unique.
* **
We now show that 0 # c (r) # c (r) # 1. First, note that      
* **
and and that c (0) = c (0) = 1. Furthermore,
** **  
PG
For c (r) = c (r) in the private goods case the right-hand sides of (A4) and (A5) must be equal.
* **
This implies that                                                which is satisfied only by r = 1. The corre-
sponding PG condition, is also satisfied only by r = 1. Hence, c # c
*  **
for public, as well as private, goods. Finally, note that c  and c  are monotonously decreasing in
* **
b. In the limit as b 6 0 , c  =  c  = 1 and as b 6 +4, c  = 0. Hence, 0 # c  # c # 1. 
* ** * * **
Step II: Asymmetric equilibria cannot exist unless g(g(x)) intersects the 45E line more than
once. The limiting case occurs for c (r) when g(g(x)) is tangent to the 45E line at x, where x lies
**
on the upward sloping segment between two peaks of g(g(x)) (see proof of Proposition 1). In this
interval g(g(x)) is first strictly convex and then strictly concave. Moreover, for c = c (r),
**
M g(g(x))/MxMc < 0 and M g(g(x))/Mx  = 0. Hence, an increase in c will cause g(g(x)) to cut the 45E
2 2 2
line from above (one fixed point), while a reduction will cause it to cut from below (three fixed
points). Since c (r) is unique, this result is independent of the magnitude of the change in c.
**
Hence, there are three fixed points for c < c  and one for c > c .
** **x 1/r’(a%bx)/2.
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By construction, c (r) partitions the c r- space [0,1]  so that the small firm has a strictly
* 2
positive market share if and only if c > c . Thus, an asymmetric equilibrium with strictly positive
*
market shares for both firms exists for c0[c , c ], which establishes claim (ii). 
* **
We proceed to claim (iii). Let firm 2 be the small firm and assume that q  =  q  = 0. We
- - - -
M2 A2
will show that these beliefs are fulfilled in equilibrium for c $ c (r). 
*
We begin by examining the public good case. Suppose q  = q  = 0. The demand facing
- - - -
M2 A2
firm 1, x , is then the solution to                     This follows from expression (1) for c = q  = PG A2
m
0. The threshold advertising level that makes q  = 0 rational for consumers is        M2
This follows from expression (1) for q  = q  = 0. It can be shown that x  > x  if and only if M2 A2 PG PG
m ^
c > c . Hence, if c < c  there exists no equilibrium with zero quantity expectations. We can PG PG
* *
also conclude that in the public good case x  = x . 
NM m
PG
Now consider the private good case. Suppose q  = q
- -
M2  A2
~    = 0. Firm 1, being an
unconstrained monopolist, chooses x , which is the solution to         This follows
m
from expression (5), letting c = q  = 0. The threshold advertising level that makes q  = q  = 0 A2 M2 A2
rational for consumers is  This follows from expression (3) for q  = q  = 0. M2 A2
It can be shown that x  > x if and only if c > c  where c  is defined implicitly by 
m *** *** ^
We can verify that c (0) = c (0) and that                 It can also
* ***
be shown that c (r) $ c (r) for r0(0, 1]. Thus, for c $ c  , zero quantity expectations for the
*** * ***
small firm are supported by unconstrained monopoly behavior by the large firm, i.e., x  = x .
NM mx 1/r ’  bx(2&c 2)
(4&c 2)(1&c 2)
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For c0[c , c ] the natural monopolist’s behavior is constrained by the presence of firm
* ***
2. By rewriting expression (3) we obtain the following condition determining the duopoly level
of advertising, x , given q  = q  = 0: 
d - - - -
A2 M2
By construction, x = x  for c = c  and x = x  for c = c . Since x decreases monotonically in c,
^ ^ ^ d * m ***
we have that x  # x # x  when c0[c , c ]. Now, what expectations regarding firm 1 are consistent
m d * *** ^
with q  = q  = 0? If c0[c , c ] and q  = q  = 0 then firm 1 optimally sets p  so that x = x.
- - - - - - - -
A2 M2 A2 M2 M1
* *** ^
If x > x, firm 1 can raise p  (towards the monopoly level) without threat of competition, while
^
M1
if x < x (whereby firm 2 faces a positive demand), firm 1 would want to lower p  (towards the
^
M1
duopoly level). Thus, x = x  = x and q  = q  = 0 is a rational expectations equilibrium for
NM ^ - - - -
A2 M2
c0[c , c ].  If c < c , then x > x which is inconsistent with existence of a natural monopoly
* *** * ^ d 
equilibrium. 
Step III: Finally we show that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium for b < 0. If
b < 0 then no c0[0, 1] satisfies (A4) and (A5). Since c (0) and c (1) decrease in b, it follows that
* *
c , c  > 1 for b < 0. Thus, only symmetric equilibria exist. The equations determining symmetric
* **
equilibria (A3) yield unique positive equilibrium quantities also for b < 0 and r > 1. ~
Proof of Proposition 3: The expressions in (A4) can be rewritten as
respectively. No {r, c}0[0,1]  satisfies these equalities simultaneously. Hence, c (r) in the private
2 **
good case cannot intersect the corresponding function in the public good case and, by example,
we know that c (r) is smaller in the latter case. The same argument applies for c (r). ~
** *Figure1. Consistentbeliefsfordifferentdegreesofproductdifferentiation(={0.75,0.67,0.55},=0.1,=1and=0.4). cabrFigure2.Compositefunctionscorrespondingtothegraphsin. Figure1Figure3. Thethresholdfunctionsandfor=0.1(hashedlines)and=0.1(solidlines)when=1. c*c**aabFigure4. Thresholdfunctionsfortheprivategood(leftpanel-sameas)andthepublicgoodcase(rightpanel). Figure3Figure5. Equilibriumpricesandquantitiesasfunctionsof.Solidlinesrepresentthesymmetricequilibrium,hashedlines
thelargefirminan(non-monopolistic)asymmetricequilibriumanddottedlinesthesmallfirm.
cFigure6.Equilibriumprofitlevelsintheadvertisingmarket,themediamarketandtotalprofits.